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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
W. E. WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
H. R. ESPEY, 
Defendant, 
and 
J. H. MORGAN, SR. 
Defendant and 
Cross Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 9251 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Reference in appellant's brief to the transcript will be 
designated by the letter "R." The parties will be referred 
to as in the court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of a transaction entered in to in 
August of 1954 at a time when the uranium "fever" in the 
State of Utah was reaching epidemic proportions. 
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Defendant, Espey, a non-resi<ient, contacted plaintiff 
on August 24, 1954 and asked to borrow up to $10,000.00 
from plaintiff (R-43). After some negotiating which will 
be referred to in more detail later, plaintiff did loan de-
fendant Espey $2,500.00 and in consideration therefore 
received a promissory note signed by defendant Espey and 
endorsed in blank by defendant Morgan (Ex. P-2) together 
with an agreement between defendants Espey and Morgan 
jointly as first parties and plaintiff as second party (Ex. 
P. 1). The principal controversy involves the construction 
of this agreement and the circumstances surrounding it. 
In consideration of the loan, the defendants agreed 
to deliver a note in the sum of $2,500.00 bearing 6% inter-
est for a period of five months and in addition the defend-
ants, pursuant to the agreement, gave plaintiff several 
options to purchase uranium stocks and/or to receive an 
interest in certain uranium claims. 
Paragraph 1 of the agreement provides: 
"Espey agrees to execute and deliver a Note in the 
sum of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) 
bearing six per cent ( 6%) interest for a period of five 
(5) months from date hereof. To secure said note, 
Espey authorizes J. H. Morgan, Sr. to hold for him 
in trust, seventy-five hundred shares (7500) of the 
White Canyon Mining Company stock to be de-
livered to Second Party upon failure to pay the 
Note when due." 
Paragraph 2 of the agreement gave three independent 
options to plaintiff as additional consideration with the 
provision that he could elect to choose one of the three. 
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There is no particular controversy over these three options 
contained in paragraph 2 inasmuch as plaintiff did not 
attempt to exercise any of them. However, paragraph 2 
contains the following language in addition to the three 
options referred to: 
"An [as] additional consideration for said loan and 
irrespective of which option Second Party exercises, 
First Parties agree to give Second Party an option 
on twenty-five hundred shares (2500) of White 
Canyon Mining Company stock at eighty cents (80c) 
per share, said option to be exercised on or before 
eighteen (18) ~onths from completion of the public 
offering.'' 
The note executed by Espey and endorsed by Morgan 
became due on January 24, 1955, five months after its 
execution. Plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to contact 
defendant Morgan a few days prior to the due date of the 
note, (R. 46-7) and finally contacted him some time be-
tween four to ten days after the due date and made an 
appointment to meet him in his office. (R. 47) Defendant 
Morgan was surprised that Espey had failed to pay the 
note when due and offered to make payment to plaintiff 
himself. However, when plaintiff pointed out the options 
contained in the agreement and attempted to exercise the 
option to p·urchase the additional 2500 shares of White 
Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents per share, de-
fendant Morgan refused to make any payment and in-
dicated to plaintiff that the agreement in his opinion was 
usurious and plaintiff left Morgan's office without any 
satisfaction either by way of cash or stock. (R. 47-49) 
Plaintiff then contacted an attorney and as a result 
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thereof a letter was written to defendants demanding de-
livery of 7500 shares of White Canyon stock by reason of 
the failure to pay the note at maturity and also again 
exercising the option to purchase an additional 2500 shares 
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents per 
share. (Ex. P-5) 
Some time after the action was commenced, Morgan 
paid $2,500.00 plus interest to the Clerk of the Court. The 
case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury and the 
Court found that the 7500 shares of stock held by Morgan 
was held as security only and that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to it unless it became necessary to sell the stock 
to pay the $2,500.00 note. Judgment for $2,500.00 plus 
interest from August 24, 1955 was entered in favor of 
plaintiff. The court further found that plaintiff properly 
exercised his option to purchase an additional 2500 shares 
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents a 
share, that Morgan refused ·to deliver the stock to plaintiff, 
that such refusal damaged plaintiff in the amount of 
$2,525.00, that sum being the difference between the 80 
cent option purchase price and $1.81 which was the price 
at which plaintiff could subsequently have sold the stock 
had it been delivered to him. The court also awarded 
$500.00 attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff appealed from the court's Finding and Con-
clusion that the 7500 shares of stock was to be held as se-
curity only, it being plaintiff's contention that the stock 
should have been delivered by Morgan to plaintiff since the 
note was not paid when due and that plaintiff is entitled to 
all right, title and interest in and to said stock and that the 
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failure to so deliver the stock upon default in payment of 
the note, constituted a conversion thereof by Morgan. 
Defendant Morgan has cross-appealed contending that 
the court erred in awarding damages in the amount of 
$2,525·.00 for the wrongful refusal of defendants to allow 
plaintiff to exercise his option to purchase 2500 shares of 
White Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents per share 
and also contending that plaintiff is not entitled to the 
attorney fees awarded. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON 
MINING COMPANY STOCK WAS HELD BY 
DEFENDANT MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED 
TO ALL RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO 
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MIN-
ING COMPANY STOCK UPON FAILURE OF DE-
FENDANTS TO PAY THE NOTE ON MATURITY. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT THE REFUSAL TO DELIVER 
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MIN-
ING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON 
FAILURE TO PAY THE NOTE CONSTITUTED 
A CONVERSION THEREOF BY DEFENDANT 
MORGAN. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF THE ADDDITION-
AL SUM OF $13,575.00 FOR DAMAGE S 
RESULTING FROM DEFENDANT MORGAN'S 
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO DELIVER 7500 
SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING COM-
PANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON DEFAULT 
OF PAYMENT OF' THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON 
MINING COMPANY STOCK WAS HELD BY 
DEFENDANT MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY. 
In determining the effect of the agreement under con-
sideration, we think it important to keep in mind the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction. Defendant 
Espey was a uranium promoter. He was a non-resident of 
this state and a complete stranger to plaintiff. He volun-
tarily contacted plaintiff on August 24, 1954 (R. 40) for 
the purpose of raising money to finance various uranium 
ventures (R. 42, 43) and originally asked plaintiff for 
$10,000.00. Plaintiff exp·lained that he was not in the bus-
iness of loaning money, that he was not interested in 
loaning money, that it would be- foolish to loan that kind 
of money for such a purpose to a complete stranger, where-
upon defendant Espey volunteered to include as consid-
eration for the money various stock options and as a result 
plaintiff indicated that if some local citizen with a good 
reputation would stand behind the transaction, he might 
possibly go along. Mr. Espey volunteered Mr. Morgan's 
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name and indicated he would talk to him and call back 
on plaintiff the same day. (R. 43-44) 
Espey returned with the note and agreement which 
are the subject of this action and which are identified as 
plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2. 
Paragraph 1 of the agreement provides that in con-
sideration of the loaning of the money, 
"Espey agrees to execute and deliver a note in the 
sum of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2500.00) 
bearing six per cent (6%) interest, for a peTiod of 
five (5-) months from date hereof. To secure said 
Note Espey authorizes J. H. Morgan, Sr. to hold 
for him in trust seventy-five hundred shares (7500) 
of the White Canyon Mining Company stock to be 
delivered to Second Party upon failure to pay the 
Note when due." 
It is this language which the court construed in hold-
ing that the 7500 shares of stock was held as security 
only. Plaintiff earnestly contends that such finding was in 
error and that the court should have found that the stock 
was not held as security but was held in trust by Morgan 
to be delivered to plaintiff in the event the note was not 
paid at maturity and that plaintiff was entitled to all right, 
title and interest thereto. 
While it is true the language of the instrument uses 
the words "to secure'' we think those words are unimport-
ant when the agreement is properly construed and we 
think it clearly was not the intent of the parties that the 
7500 shares of stock represent a pledge of security only. 
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It is important to bear in mind that defendants Mor-
gan and Espey are co-obligors in this agreement and that 
the stock was delivered from Espey to Morgan to hold in 
trust to be delivered to plaintiff if and only if the note was 
not paid at maturity. In other words, the possession of the 
stock was never in plaintiff (and plaintiff has not yet re-
ceived one share thereof) and under the terms of the agree-
ment, plaintiff was not even entitled to possession until and 
unless the note was not paid at maturity. 
The whole theory behind a pledge of security is that 
possession is transferred immediately to the obligee, so 
that if the obligor does not perform, the obligee then 
merely has to liquidate the security and retain from the 
liquidated funds the amount of the debt. However, where 
possssion is not transferred from the obligor or debtor to 
the creditor or obligee, it is obvious there is no pledge of 
security involved. There appears to be no conflict in the 
law on this subject. 
In 41 Am. Jur., 586, it is stated: 
"the essential elements and requisites of a pledge 
are (1) the existence of a debt or obligation, and (2) 
the transfer of property to be held as secu1·ity, and, 
if necessary, used, for the payment thereof." 
(Emphasis added) 
This court in the case of Campbell v. Peter, 108 Utah 
565, 162 Pac. 2d 754 held: 
''A pledge . . . is the passing of the possession of a 
chattel by the owner thereof to the pledgee who 
is thereby entitled to hold it until the debt is paid 
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or the obligation performed." 
The mere characterization of a transaction as "secur-
ity," "collateral" or "pledge" does not make it such, the 
intention of the parties as to the nature of the transaction 
is the controlling element. In 41 Am. Jur., 585 it is stated: 
"This intention or conduct is ascertained from the 
whole instrument evidencing the transaction, and 
not from particular words therein. Thus, the fact 
that the word 'pledge' is employed in an instrument 
evidencing a transaction does not conclusively de-
termine its character ... " 
It has consistently been held delivery is essential to 
a valid pledge. The court in Hodge v. Truax, 184 Wash. 
360, 51 Pac. 2d 357 stated; 
"One of the prime requisites of a pledge is that the 
pledgor has parted with his property and that the 
pledgee has possession or control over it." 
This court in Campbell v. Peter, supra, stated: 
"A pledge to be valid depends upon possession by 
the pledgee or his agent, either actual or construc-
tive, of the chattel at all times until the fulfillment 
of the obligation which it secures ... Possession is 
an essentional element of a pledge and without it 
there can be no pledge." 
These principles are forcefully set forth in 41 Am. Jur., 
592-593 as follows: 
" ... it is essential to a consummated contract of 
pledge that there shall have been a delivery of the 
pledged property,- either actual or constructive, to 
the pledgee or to a pledge holder. Good faith does 
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not avail the pledgee either actual or constructive. 
Until the act of delivery has been perfor~ed the 
special property which the pledgee is entitled to 
hold does not vest in him. The requirement of pos-
session is an inexorable rule of law, ... Generally, 
delivery must have been as complete as the nature 
of the property permits. The pledgee's possssion, to 
be effective either for notice or to give validity at 
law to the pledge, must be complete, unequivocal, 
and exclusive of the pledgor's possession in his 
own right." 
Actual delivery to and possession by the creditor is 
a prime requi~ite in order to constitute a pledge. It is pos-
sible, however, that delivery can be made to a third per-
son for and on behalf of the creditor to constitute a con-
structive delivery, but it is apparent that such was not 
the case here. Morgan, the so-called pledge holder, was 
not selected by plaintiff as is required by law in order to 
constitute a constructive delivery. See 41 Am. Jur., 599. 
In fact, Morgan was a co-obligor in the agreement and a 
close associate of defendant Espey. Further, the language 
of the agreement itself gives plaintiff no right to the re-
quisite possession unless and until the note is not paid at 
maturity, nor was Morgan authorized to deliver the stock 
to plaintiff until that time. Certainly this is not constructive 
delivery in any sense. 
Where there is a close relationship beween the pledg-
or and the stake holder, the alleged fulfillment of the re-
quirement of delivery should be carefully scrutinized in 
view of the real danger that the actual control may 
never be surrendered by the debtor-pledgor. In the 
instant case there was and is such a close relationship 
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between defendants Espey and Morgan. They are co-obli-
gors in this transaction, both having signed the promissory 
note and they together constitute "parties of the first part" 
for the purposes of the agreement under consideration. 
They are also closely associated as stockholders of the 
White Canyon Mining Company. The closeness of the re-
lationship indicates that the pledgor herein never relin-
quished actual control over the stock. 
The Supreme Court of Washington passed on this 
type situation in the case of Kietz v. Gold Point Mines, Inc. 
105 Pac. 2d, 71. In that case the plaintiff loaned a thousand 
dollars to defendant company and entered into a·greement 
whereby it was clearly spelled out that 25,000 shares of 
stock was to be pledged and assigned to plaintiff as secur-
ity for the note and the agreement further spelled out the 
intent of the parties by indicating that plaintiff was to 
transfer the stock back to defendant upon payment of the 
note. The stock certificate, however was retained by the 
secretary of the defendant corporation. The court held that 
there was no pledge of the stock because possession had 
not been transferred to plaintiff. The following language is, 
we think, important: 
"In passing upon the question of necessity of de-
livery of personal property to complete a pledge, 
this court stated in Kuhn v. Groll, 118 Wash. 285, 
203 P. 44, 47: 
'It is true that the law requires a delivery of the 
pledged property from the pledgor to the pledgee 
and a retention of it by the pledgee in order to make 
the pledge fully effectual as security. We think the 
law applicable to the situaiiori we find here is well 
stated in 21 R.C.L. 643, as follows: 
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' "The requirement of possession is an inexor~ble 
rule of law, adopted to prevent fraud and deception, 
for, if the debtor remains in possession, the law 
presumes that those who deal with him do so on 
the faith of his being the unqualified owner of the 
goods." ' " 
It is essential to the existance of a constructive pledge 
that the pledgee creditor have the continuous right to pos-
session of the pledged article. This, of course, was not the 
case herein. The very fact that it is necessary to sue for 
possession of the stock in question, indicates that the cred-
itor herein has not had and does not have the actual or 
constructive possession of the stock in question. 
This litigation is not the usual type which arises 
in the case of a pledge. In the typical case it is the 
pledgor who must sue the pledgee for return of the article 
which was transferred for security, but here since posses-
sion was never transferred, it is the creditor who now is 
forced to sue for possession of the stock to which he was 
clearly entitled upon default in payment of the note. 
The language of this agreement is in the alternative. 
The obligors, defendants Morgan and Espey intended to 
be able to discharge the $2,500.00 obligation by deliYery 
of the stock, should it be reduced in value. In other words, 
the agreement gives defendants the choice of paying the 
note when due or in lieu thereof delivering the stock. 
A finding that the stock was not given as security 
but was in fact to be given in lieu of payment of the note 
' at the option of the defendants, is not only compelled by 
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the law, but also by the facts surrounding the transaction. 
Mr. Williams testified that he was not in the business of 
loaning money and certainly would not loan money to a 
stranger at 6% interest. (R. 43) He further testified that it 
was his understanding that if the stock had gone down 
in value, the defendants could have satisfied their obliga-
tion to him insofar as the $2,500.00 loan was concerned 
by delivering 7500 shares of stock. If in fact the stock had 
-been worth less than $2,500.00 at the time the note was 
due, there is no doubt but that the defendants would have 
satisfied their obligation by transferring the 7500 shares 
of stock to p·laintiff. Plaintiff was willing to take the 
gamble of such a transaction with the hope that even 
should he be forced to accept the stock with a then value 
less than the note amount, the stock would subsequently 
achieve a substantial increase in value. Furthermore, it 
is important to remember that the defendants gave plain-
tiff several other options covering other stocks as addition-
al consideration for advancing the $2,500.00 and the 
transaction took place during the highly speculative pe-
riod involving the uranium boom in Utah. At that time 
uranium stock values were an unknown factor and 
fluctuated wildly. 
The total lack of delivery of the alleged "security" 
to either the creditor or to a bona fide pledge-holder 
coupled with the clear import of the language of the agree-
ment that the 7500 shares of stock were to be paid over 
in their entirety upon default of payment of the note, 
cannot but compel the conclusion that the stock was not 
given Morgan as security. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN F AI LIN<;} 
TO F1ND THAT PLAINTIFYF WAS ENTITLED 
TO ALL RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO 
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE, CANYON MIN-
ING COMPANY STOCK UPON FAILURE OF DE-
FENDANTS TO PAY THE NOTE ON MATURITY. 
Insofar as the 7500 shares of stock is concerned, de-
fendant Morgan is a mere naked trustee and nothing more. 
The alternative agreement authorizes Morgan to hold the 
stock in trust for Espey to be delivered to plaintiff upon 
failure to pay the note when due. (Defendant Espey did 
not appear at the trial and has been heard from only once, 
by telephone, since the transaction was entered into, and 
then some one and one-half to two years after the trans-
action. (R. 45) Counsel for both defendants indicated the 
whereabouts of Espey was and is unknown and that he 
may well be dead (R. 36 & 61). This agreement gave 
Morgan no right or interest whatever in the stock. It 
remained the property of Espey until and unless given 
over to plaintiff. Morgan's obligation with respect to the 
stock is clearly set forth in the agreement. In the event 
the note was paid, he was, as trustee, to return it to de-
fendant Espey. In the event the note was not paid at 
maturity, he was to deliver it absolutely and with no 
qualifications to plaintiff. Under no circumstances could 
he claim it as his own. 
There can be no question that the note was not paid 
at maturity and that actions of Morgan when demand was 
made for payment do not constitute an offer of payment. 
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When Mr. Williams called on defendant Morgan in 
connection with this transaction approximately one week 
to 10 days after the note was due, it is true that Morgan 
initially made an offer to make payment of the $2,500.00. 
But this offer was clearly conditional inasmuch as when 
plaintiff mentioned the options connected with _the agree-
ment, defendant Morgan, although expressing no concern 
in connection with the Coyote interest, totally refused all 
payment when plaintiff mentioned the White Canyon op-
tion on page 2 of the agreement granting plaintiff the 
option to purchase an additional 2500 shares of White 
Canyon stock at 80 cents per share. Upon mention of this 
option, Morgan immediately withdrew his offer to make 
payment of the note and said: "I'll see you in hell first 
on that one. You will not get it." (R. 48) 
It is elementary that a conditional tender is 
ineffectual. 
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Volume 6, 
Section 1814 states: 
" ... a tender of performance of an absolute obliga-
tion of the debtor must be unconditional, since 
the debt itself is unconditional. No tender can be 
effective if its acceptance would prejudice the cred-
itor's rights;" 
"Therefore, a condition that a payment shall be 
taken in full discharge or as a compromise of the 
debtor's obligation, or that the creditor shall give 
a receipt in full of all demands, ... invalidates a 
tender." 
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This court has held that a tender of less than the 
amount due, if refused, has no legal significance and that 
nothing short of everything that the creditor is entitled to 
receive is a sufficient tender. Siverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 
351, 273 Pac. 2d, 974. See also the annotation in 5 A. L. R. 
1226 which cites the general rule that: 
"A tender must include everything to which the 
creditor is entitled, and a tender of any less sum 
is nugatory and ineffective as a tender." 
See also 52 Am. J ur., 230. 
The offer by Morgan to make payment of the note 
alone was conditioned upon plaintiff's willingness to waive 
this right and relinquish this option. Certainly such a 
tender is totally ineffective. 
The court properly found that plaintiff did exercise 
this option to which he was unquestionably entitled re-
gardless of whether Morgan paid the note or gave up the 
7500 shares of stock, and that the failure of defendant Mor-
gan to sell the stock to plaintiff at the option price resulted 
in plaintiff's damage in the amount of $2,5-25.00. Since 
plaintiff has been held by the lower court to be fully entit-
led to exercise the option, it is apparent that the tender of 
payment of the note conditioned upon the waiver of that 
right was no tender at all. We submit, therefore, that the 
note payment was in default and that upon such default by 
the clear intent of the contract, plaintiff was entitled to 
have the stock delivered to him according to the terms of 
the agreement and that such delivery should pass all right, 
title and interest thereto in lieu of the payment of the 
promissory note. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT THE REFUSAL TO DELIVER 
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MIN-
ING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON 
FAILURE TO PAY THE NOTE CONSTITUTED 
A CONVERSION THEREOF BY DEFENDANT 
MORGAN. 
The 7500 shares of stock in question do not under any 
circumstances belong to defendant Morgan. He is merely 
a trustee or at least a bailee with instructions to hold the 
stock for the use and benefit of Espey until the note ma-
tures and at maturity, in the event the note is not paid, 
to deliver the stock to plaintiff. The wrongful refusal to 
deliver the stock to plaintiff upon failure to pay the note 
at maturity, constitutes a conversion thereof. The general 
rule is stated in 53 Am. Jur., 822 as follows: 
''The gist of a conversion has been declared to be 
not the acquisition of the property by the wrong-
doer, but the wrongful deprivation of a person of 
property to the possession of which he is entitled. 
A conversion consists of an act in derogation of 
the plaintiff's possessory rights, and any wrongful 
exercise or assumption of authority over another's 
goods, depriving him of the possession, perman-
ently or for an indefinite time, is a conversion." 
This court in the case of Christensen v. Pugh, 84 Utah 
440, 36 Pac. 2d 100, quoted with approval the definition 
found in 2 Greenleaf on Evid. Section 642 as follows: 
"Conversion consists either in the appropriation of 
a thing to the party's own use and beneficial en-
joyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising do-
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minion over it in exclusion or defiance of the 
owner's right ~r in withholding the possession of 
the property from the owner under a claim of title 
inconsistent with his own.'' 
The court went on to say: 
"The gist of conversion is not the acquisition of 
property by a wrongdoer, but the wrongful depri-
vation of it to the owner." 
We submit that there can be no question concerning 
Morgan's conversion of the stock. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF THE ADDDITION-
AL SUM OF $13,575.00 FOR DAMAGE S 
RESULTING FROM DEFENDANT MORGAN'S 
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO DELIVER 7500 
SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING COM-
PANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON DEFAULT 
OF PAYMENT OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
Plaintiff introduced, without objection by defendants, 
a letter from J. A. Hogle and Company, (Ex. P-4) indi-
cating that the highest market value of the White Canyon 
Mining Company stock was reached on October 16, 1955, 
some nine months after plaintiff was entitled to the stock-
that price being $1.81 per share. 
The measure of damages for conversion of a chattel 
of fluctuating value is the highest market value between 
the conversion and either a reasonable time thereafter or 
between the conversion and the date of trial. See 53 Am. 
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Jr., 891; 40 A. L. R. 1288 and 87 A. L. R. 818. The high 
market value of $1.81 occurring only nine months from 
date of conversion would allow plaintiff to recover at that 
figure under either rule stated above. 
On the basis of the evidence and the· above rule, the 
trial court properly assessed plaintiff's damages for de-
fendants' failure to allow exercise of the option to purchase 
2500 shares on the basis of $1.01 per share, the difference 
between the option price of $.80 and the high market value 
of $1.81. Utilizing this same evidence and rule of law plain-
tiff's damage for the withholding of the 7500 shares of stock 
amounts $13,575.00. Plaintiff should have receiyed 7500 
shares of stock, upon the failure to pay the note, at no cost 
hence his damage by defendant Morgan's wrongful refusal 
amounts to a loss of the full price of $1.81 for each of the 
7500 shares wrongfull withheld, or $13,575.00. 
Defendant failed to raise any objection to this measure 
of damage either at the trial or in connection with the 
points raised on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court committed re-
versible error in holdirig- that the 7500 shares of White 
Canyon Mining Company stock was held by defendant 
Morgan as security only and that under the contract and 
the circumstances surrounding the execution thereof, it 
is clear that the stock was not pledged as security but was 
given to defendant Morgan in trust to be delivered to 
plaintiff with full right, title and interest thereto in the 
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event the note was not paid. The note was not paid and 
has not been paid and defendant Morgan has wrongfully 
converted the stock to his own use and deprived plaintiff 
of it thereby preventing plaintiff from selling same at the 
high market value of $1.81 per share, damaging plaintiff 
in the sum of $13,575.00 rather than the $2,500.00 plus 
interest as payment of the note, awarded by the court. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court's 
decision insofar as it considered the 7500 shares of stock 
as security should be reversed and judgment entered in 
favor of plaintiff for $13,575.00 damages for the wrongful 
convers1on of said stock in addition to the attorney's fees 
awarded and the $2,525.00 awarded for the option stock. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK K. BOYLE, 
RICHARD R. BOYLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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